Bureaucracy Subsumed Within Dominant Party

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Abstract: In Ethiopian, the ruling party aggressively strives to control every detail of the civil service. Thus, the civil servants are strongly influenced by the ruling elite. Put differently, political affiliation in the civil service seems a deep rooted practice. Nevertheless, deep politicization of civil service structures blurs the distinctions between politics and administration and between politicians and public officials. In Ethiopia, therefore, politics is over expanded, jeopardizing the development of autonomous public administration.

Party domination on the public service appears in different forms and mechanisms. The first mechanism to dominate the public service is through indoctrination of ideology. Civil servants are highly influenced by party ideology and shaped to think and evaluate their actions in terms of their party discipline and principles. Second since appointment and promotions are political, civil servants are co-opted to join the ruling party. As a result the public service has become an extension of the party organ in government. While, the general framework and some laws are there that intend creating neutral and apolitical civil service, these laws are critically violated. As a result, though political neutrality is supposed to be part of the public service ethos, the reality is that Ethiopian public service is not as apolitical as it is supposed to be.

1. Introduction

Politicsation implies exposure of bureaucracy to political forces and pressures. To the greatest extent, politicization represents a threat to civil servants’ especially senior civil servants professional status and values as politicians want to influence civil servants’ behaviour and work. Aberbach, et al., (1981) [1] regard the notion of civil servants’ politicization as synonymous with the violation of the principle of political neutrality of civil service.

Peters and Pierre (2004) [2] argue that actually, the public service is inherently a political creation, and inherently involved in politics, simply because it is the structure that delivers public services to the citizens – it plays a role in determining ‘who gets what’ from the public sector.1 I this sense, any public service serve the politics of the incumbent by implementing the policies, thereof the manifesto of the party in power. However, while any institution is concerned with issues of governing can never be made fully apolitical; it has to be removed from the more direct forms of partisan control. Party-defined senior civil servants hence do not necessarily entail the presence of politicization, as everybody has the right to his or her own political beliefs, which he or she can express more or less actively.

However, there is a need to distinguish between politicization in the partisan sense on one hand and politicization meaning tight control over the civil service by elected officials on the other hand. In the former sense, political appointments serve many functions which are critical to democratic government such as policy choice and accountability. Thus, leaving few spaces for political appointments at the top helps the government of the day to have control over bureaucracy (Peters and Pierre, 2004) [2]. It is also argued that a positive connotation could be there with politicized bureaucracy where greater political commitment may energize the public service in a way that may not be possible with a more neutral public service.

Therefore, the kind of politicization which is fatal for a civil service is politicization which involves a kind of deep-rooted introduction of party-politics into the civil service. The danger behind such politicization is that it undermines merit based employment and promotion in the civil service,

1 Harold Lasswell (1958) [3] defined politics as ‘who gets what, when and how’ and this definition of politics has encapsulated political behaviour around the world, with politicians being driven by political positions, resource distribution and out-competing their competitors. This has led to much political apathy around the world, along with the corporatization of the state, with vested interests penetrating political systems and having a large say over policy and legislation formulations.
Neutrality of the civil service requires civil servants to be apolitical in carrying out their functions, and impartial in implementing government policies, programmes and projects. Thus, in a neutral public service, appointments, promotions and tenure of civil servants are not dependent on a particular ruling party or minister being in power, but on the prescriptions of public service acts and regulations. This minimizes the possibility of civil servants serving partisan political interests instead of national interest. Therefore, if independent, no, partisan, and functioning civil service is needed it is must to protect the institution from direct forms of partisan control.

Cognizant to the above discussion, this chapter intends to address the second research question: ‘To what extent Ethiopian civil service is neutral or free from politicization so that it functions without any external interference and/or domination’?

To this effect, issues pertinent to neutrality and politicization are discussed. Accordingly, emphasis is given to the role of the ruling party and its politicians in appointment and promotion, ethnicity and representation, and cronyism and clientelism. This is done based on the arguments and assertions stated by scholars and the evidences from real practices in the ground.

2. Party Dominance over the Bureaucracy

Scholars, who wrote on developmental states (for example, Leftwich, 1995) [5], argued that in many of developmental states single party dominance was common.2 The majority of developmental states are typically featured a dominant political party. They tend to be governed by a powerful political party. Consequently, bureaucracies in developmental states tend to be subsumed within the dominant party system, which again highlights the politicised nature of bureaucracies in developmental states. In countries where single dominant parties rule:

The dominant party remains in power for so long it becomes synonymous to the state. Sometimes . . . the party generally
enjoys absolute majority in parliament, its caucus gets to deploy loyalists or strategic elites to staff the civil service, its ideologies and slogans are the singsong in public gatherings, and whether ‘by hook or by crook’, it is sure of winning the next elections. Opposition parties on the other hand are reduced to groups of frustrated individuals limited in scope, with inadequate resources and no significant chance of creating a nation - wide impact (Ferim, 2013: 304 -305)[6].

In this sense, one party dominance is also feature of Ethiopian politics. In Ethiopia, currently, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) is the ruling party of the present government; and it has been winning the last five elections since 1995. This demonstrates that we have one dominant party; however, in the context of a multi party setting of a constitutional socio-economic and political system. Nevertheless, the empirical data reveal that, unlike many developmental states, where political appointments are limited to only to upper senior civil servants; Political affiliation in the civil service seems a deep rooted practice. In the Ethiopian bureaucracy, the party dominance stretches to the level of ordinary civil servants and to the extent of giving extra privileges to party members so as to dominate the system. This is to mean, there is huge political influence in appointments of civil service officials. In Ethiopia, therefore, politics is over expanded, jeopardizing the development of autonomous public administration. Party domination on the public service appears in different forms and mechanisms. Generally speaking, there are two mechanisms of subduing the public service. The first is indoctrinating the public servants with the ideology of the dominant party. The ruling party does this mostly through its cadre in the public service and sometimes by high party officials. According to many key informants and also the observation of the researcher it is not uncommon to see civil servants get together and hold party meetings. In such meetings, they usually discuss on ideological matters based on the ruling party ideology magazine - addis raeyi. They also make gimgemas (critics and self critics) on their official duties in the framework of party ideology. Most of the time, such meetings are led by the respective office holders who are also party members. These activities shape the civil servants to think and evaluate their activities in office from the perspective of party politics and ideology. As a result, public service institutions have become the ruling party affiliates. This in turn leads to assuming control over the bureaucratic machinery and changing the attitude and culture of public administration.

Therefore, the designs of most controlling systems in public sectors are highly influenced by the ideology of political party in power. An imposition of ideology implies controlling norms, values, expectations, attitudes, and beliefs of individuals, and it is tantamount to enforcing social control without getting the willingness of the group. This, according to Etzioni (1975) [7] is called ‘copying a controlling method used in ideological organisations to economic organisations’, which will definitely have a negative effect on the performances of the civil service. Furthermore, the attempt of politicians to use their ideologies to control government organisations may cause divergence of goals between the politicians and the civil servants. As a result, the lack of traditions of anonymity, political neutrality and impartiality has led to the creation of a ‘political’ public service.

The second form of party domination manifests itself in terms of appointments of senior civil servants. In Ethiopian public service, politics is involved in the appointment and career process in at least two ways. First, political executive has explicit and direct influence. In this sense, the political executive has got legal background to appoint and dismiss high level officials like ministers and state ministers³. If we consider ministerial positions, for example, among the twenty five ministers who are currently at office only one is a non member. The majority of ministers, twenty two, are EPRDF members and two are EPRDF allies⁴, party members.

³ The Prime Minister shall submit for approval to the House of Peoples’ Representatives nominees for ministerial posts from among members of the two Houses or from among persons who are not members of either House and possess the required qualifications (FDRE Constitution, 1994, Art 74(2))⁳

⁴ Five regions of Ethiopia are governed by parties which are heavily influenced by the EPRDF. These are (1) the Afar National Democratic Party in Afar region; (2) the Harari National League in the Harari Region; (3) the Gambela People's Democratic Movement in the Gambela region; (4) the Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region; and (5) The Somale People Democratic Party in the Somale region.
The other is implicit, indirect, and not legally supported. In this case, the ministers and state ministers, who are political appointees themselves, influence appointment and promotion of middle level officials like directorate directors and team leaders. Here, politicization of the civil service is most manifested in terms of high political interference and imposition of political criteria to appoint in a position that critically needs merit. Accordingly, similar to the ministers and state ministers, because the politicians want to influence the conduct and operation of the civil service leadership, the ruling Party deploys its loyal members to different senior positions in the public service. Thus, it can be said that the appointment of politicians in senior bureaucratic positions such as directorate director level and at the middle level positions like team leader is viewed as a means of controlling bureaucrats and the civil service. Accordingly, the senior managers of the administration are mostly members of the ruling party. In fact, senior civil servants are often members of a political-administrative elite and equal partner in governing.

In the same token, focus group participants said that under EPRDF rule, priority seems to be given to the civil servants who declare membership of the party. There is a real EPRDF tendency to control and possess the whole state apparatus. The majority of the higher civil servant positions are occupied by EPRDF and its ally’s cadres. With regard to the choice of position holders, the partisan equation is surely extremely important. Those who are known to be opponents in the administration are excluded from holding higher administrative positions.

On the other hand it is important to note that “political involvement in senior appointments and dismissals does not necessarily make the decision politically partisan” Evans 1995) [9]. For example, while in Japan prime ministers typically only appoint dozens of officials, these appointments, have tended to be made on the basis of expertise, commitment to reforms, and trust based on various informal ties, not personal connections alone (Evans 1995) [10]. Contrarily, though the appointing body is similar, the prime minister and regional state presidents, in Ethiopia, the efficiency and autonomy of the bureaucracy appear to have been compromised. This is mainly because of the political and ethnic considerations in appointment of these officials which has hurt the quality and effectiveness of the public administration. What is more, one of the key informants expressed that using these two mechanisms, “party leaders have laid their hands on everything in the civil service”. Consequently, the civil servants are strongly influenced by the ruling elite; and the civil service has become generally ruler dominated. All these posts have become subject to political appointment, and professional (merit) criteria for the appointment of staff to these posts are dropped. Therefore, such interferences enabled the ruling party and its government to entirely dominate the civil service system. Hence, it is logical and evidenced to claim that Ethiopian public service belongs to the ruling party.

Therefore, while political neutrality is supposed to be part of the public service ethos, the reality is that the ruling party has made it an extension of its structure. The politicisation of the civil service is continued to the extent it becomes difficult to separate the ruling party (as the government of the day) and the public service. Hence, Ethiopian public service is not as apolitical as it is supposed to be.

The other pertinent issue need to be noted is that all these party domination exhibit violation of the legal frameworks and provisions. This is to say that, at least, the constitution and the federal civil servants proclamation do not explicitly put that party and government is the same. Similarly, almost all key informants and focus group discusants generally agreed that the laws and/or associated conventions did establish the principle of apolitical public service. That means, the legal framework and principles of political neutrality are usually present in the Ethiopian public service. However, as demonstrated by empirical data, despite the presence of the legal frameworks, the government wants to dominate the civil service by design. In this sense, the domination of the ruling party and its affiliates occurs by undermining civil service laws.

According to many of the focus group discussion participants, the problem of politicization is partly attributed to the lack of enforcement of rules and weak monitoring and evaluation practices. Here, the point is that because there is no effective system that enable promotions and appointments made based on only merit, it makes easier for politicians to use their office to reward loyal supporters with government positions. This in turn has led to a further decline in terms of competitiveness of the Civil Service to deliver the expected output. To put differently, politicization of human resource recruitment, assignment and management dilute professionalization of civil service. Regarding this point, one of the key informants in ministry of public service and good governance stated that:

At first step everyone, regardless of party membership, can be given a chance to
compete for a given position. The problem is, however, you will be filtered out not only based on objective parameters like educational qualification, experience and to some extent work performance. Once you qualify for the position there is also some subjective additive called attitude which implicitly imply membership. Therefore, most of the civil servants are co-opted to join the ruling party if they want to be promoted to the next higher position.

These claims and observations of the key informants and focus group discussion participants also exactly align with respondents of the questioner. Respondents were asked four questions to understand their perceptions and believe on the neutrality of directorate directors and process owners in their respective ministries. Let us see their responses in table 1.

**Table 1 Civil servants perception and believes on neutrality of public service officials.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directorate Directors are more politically oriented/attuned.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process owners are more politically oriented/attuned.</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>15</td>
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As illustrated in table 1, 84% and 65% of the respondents respectively believe that directorate directors and process owners are politically oriented. This means they are political appointees. Similarly, 81% and 61% of the respondents disagree that these middle level officials are more political oriented than being professionals. The other challenge related to civil servants perception which is observed during focus group discussions and interviews with key informants is that the majority of them consider appointing politicians to civil service positions is normal and acceptable. It is this perception and belief that drives civil servants to join the ruling party, if they want to go up to the position ladder in the civil service. This is to say that both senior and middle level positions are politically appointed; to be accepted at these positions the candidate has to be appointed by the relevant political organization. This applies to the positions of not only directorate directors and state ministers but to team leaders too.

Many focus group discussion participants agree that a given vacant post, especially at middle and higher level, may require, among other qualifications and requirements, also attitude and loyalty toward FDRE constitution, nations, nationalities and peoples, etc. Here, the problem is that all these parameters cannot be measured objectively. What is more, political appointments short-circuit the rules on qualifications, and bypass qualified civil servants who have put in the years. Strengthening the argument, one of the discussants in focus group discussions said, "It seems that the qualifications required for senior posts are sometimes changed to fit particular people". Hence, many administrative officials and ordinary civil servants use political influence or forge alliance with the politician to brighten their own career prospects. Thus, politicization works the other way round also; in a sense, civil servants themselves consider joining a political party which they think provide them rent in exchange of their membership; in this context - promotion and position.

The researcher went through the profiles of all directorate directors and team leaders in the case ministries and found that the majority of them came from regional governments' wereda or zone offices where they were cabinet members. This imply that almost all middle and higher level bureaucrats are appointed by political or hybrid procedures which results in bringing a low degree of political neutrality. Of course, there are very few non member officials but it is learned that the number of politically appointed officials has been increasing; and its increment is faster than the non party member office holders.

In this regard, very challenging is the fact that the influence of individual political principals on the public bureaucracy is becoming tighter as
promotion to the headship positions in most public bureaucratic organization is based on how that principal views the client (the civil servant) and not on the basis of relevant or associated experience and seniority. Logically, making the politically appointed officials more loyal to their principals than to the principles of legality and the rule of law results in the weakening of civil service accountability and greatly undermines the principles of professionalism and political neutrality. These practices and contexts in turn jeopardize the neutrality and appropriateness of the appointments decisions taken. Consequently, promoted officials serve the interests of their patrons even if these oppose to the public interest. This state of affairs also promotes the formation of corrupt networks in which, individualistic and partisan aims replace public ones. Regarding this, one key informant who is a senior expert said that “Politicians tend to give the opportunity of office holding in the civil service not only to their party comrades but also to patrons in their rent seeking networks.” In this sense, clientelism can be thought of as a type of instrumental friendship—though not an evenly balanced friendship. Typically, the inefficient and unqualified civil servants are drawn into these “problem-solving networks” as a pragmatic means to find solutions to their everyday concerns. This is particularly detectable in middle level staffs like directors and ministerial advisors delegated to ministers and state ministers. Of course, clientelism is now often used to characterize entire political systems. Observers of Ethiopian politics commonly note nationwide pyramids of patrons and clients culminating with the national leader.

Understandably, in a context where an autonomous public administration has not been formed, political corruption is favoured by the absence of a clear delineation between administrative and political elites. This in turn leads to constant direct interference by political interests and party considerations in administrative activity. Official appointments will also have their source in political patronage instead of professional qualifications. It may also cause lack of accountability on public goods provision as the system becomes corrupt.

3. Why Do The Ruling Party and Its Officials Want to Dominate The Civil Service?

The government tries to justify the deployment of party loyalists into the civil service. For example, in the words of one senior party official, “the ruling party has the responsibility to make sure that people who are committed to the party’s transformation agenda occupy senior positions not only at federal level but in the regional and local levels too”. What follows this assertion is that it is logical and imperative to control the civil servants thereby the civil service. This is to say that the ruling party has to control over the civil service. Similarly, one of the interviewed state ministers was asked why ministers and state ministers do prefer political cadres over experienced civil servants for positions like advisor, and directorate directors. He explained the case as follows:

Because Ethiopia is one of the countries with a long tradition of paternalistic government, with the ruling class also social elite, the connotation is that politics is some disreputable activity in which the best people do not indulge. Many civil servants pretend as if they abstained from party politics, and argued that they, therefore, abtain from politics together. One thing they missed is, however, the cause of nation building is above politics and by implication fostering common understanding and commitment based on clearly defined internal and external policies. For this reason, they prefer to operate at distance from the political executive. Consequently, the political executive is obliged to bring officials with relevant educational background and experience from regions. Most of those who come from regions are party members with high profile. However, poor performance on the part of top and middle level public service managers, simply on account of their loyalty to the party on power, must not be tolerated.

Implicit to this argument is that the purpose of politicization of the civil service in the Ethiopian civil service system is more to control and implement policy than just supply jobs for party members. This assumption and practice also explained by Heywood (1997:355) [11] “the attraction of a political senior bureaucracy plainly ensures that there is a higher level of loyalty and
commitment in such [party affiliated] a group than would be likely among politically impartial civil servants”. He further stated that one of the most common ways of exercising political control is to recruit the senior bureaucracy into the ideological enthusiasms of the government of the day.

However, in the case of Ethiopian civil service, deep politicization of civil service structures blurs the distinctions between politics and administration and between politicians and public officials. Such politicization stifled career perspectives for those already employed. It has also made the public administration unattractive for young graduates.

There is also another argument which is similar to the above argument. Some key informants who are retired senior civil servants and veteran politicians argue that one of the key organizational developments of the past quarter century has been the shift in the party centre of gravity from society to the state. They explain that in the first years of the coming power of EPRDF, the party was a ‘dominant mass party’. This is to say that, in those early days, the EPRDF was strongly rooted within the mass rural voters and lower level income urban residents, and during which it laid great emphasis on its representative role. Now, the ruling party has begun to take its principal term of reference from within the political institutions, and has begun to define itself primarily as governor. Hence, for these observers, politicization of administration was caused by most of all by the weakness of the political sphere. In other words, because EPRDF loses confidence on its voters, it switches its trust from the voters to government bureaucracy - politicization to the extent of using the bureaucracy as an extension of the party.

There are also peoples who argue that now the concept of a politically neutral civil service seems clearly not relevant in a dominant–party system of government of the kind that exist today. According to these people, there may be no need to provide continuity at the level of the civil service when there was continuity at the political level. At the same time, however, the utmost role of civil service is to ensure stability and flexibility of public administration, its responsiveness to the societal demands.

Here, what this argument fails to consider is that politicization hinders continuity. In countries where a dominant party has been in power for a number of years, new political leaders may not trust a bureaucracy associated with the previous regime. The civil service is not impartial between parties, but works for the elected government of the day, and is, therefore, partial to the successful implementation of the policies of that government. It is also agreed that the role of civil servants cannot not be questioning the political basis of government policies, but advising on their practicality and to carry them out effectively. This is to mean independence and impartiality should not prevent the civil service responding to political priorities.

Therefore, the greatest peril of politicization occurs when the government changes, because the future careers of civil servants depend upon the representatives of the political power currently in force and their decisions about the (new) appointments to senior civil service positions. For this reason, excessive dependence of the civil service upon political circumstances is risky for the stability of the state; it weakens the institutional capacity of public administration and decreases the quality of public services. To overcome this challenge, creating a permanent civil service, willing and professional which acts loyally for successive governments without political prejudice is a must.

Still there is another argument that tries to justify politicization of the public service. This argument associates the politicization of the bureaucracy with the ideological orientation of the senior party/government officials. For example, some veteran senior party official stated that "The idea of an apolitical civil service is inconvenient and difficult for the pro-communist political elites to accept, as it had its political initiation under communism and is used to political subordination of administration." According to the argument, this has resulted in the persistence of different forms of malpractice and abuse thereby replicating the practices of the Dergue era. This means, the bureaucracy has continued to be politicized and this continues to sabotage the conduct of its business and its overall performance. As a result, in all levels of government, political considerations increasingly impede the smooth running of the civil service in accordance with existing legal procedures.

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7 Significant number of politicians both in the ruling party and oppositions emerged out of Marxist ideology which was popular in 1960s and 70s. What is more, the civil service was influenced by Marxist regime for seventeen years under the Dergue. The political culture of that period is still alive and it continuous to have a fundamental impact on the current state of performance and facilitates such negative phenomena as clientelism and corruption.
To sum up an effective de-politicization of the public service requires an understanding that civil service officials do not necessarily have to be political to support the government of the day to deliver, and that politicians do not have to get involved in the day-to-day running of a ministry for them to have their policies implemented. It is the skills and knowledge they acquire that allow the bureaucrats to carry out their administrative duties with no major interruptions from politicians. Political interference in day-to-day administrative functions tends to paralyze administration and that there is a poor definition of the roles and functions of employees. For example, remarkable economic growth in Malaysia reveals the positive impact that a professional and comparatively meritocratic bureaucracy contributes to economic growth, if the economic decision-making is insulated from political pressures (Desta, 2011) [12]. However, in our case, politicization of the state institutions eventually culminates into poor institutional capacity and lack of accountability. Thus, in order for achieving the national development agenda, the civil service needs to improve the competence of its public bureaucracy and keep them politically neutral.

4. Conclusions

In Ethiopian, the ruling party aggressively strives to control every detail of the civil service. Thus, the civil servants are strongly influenced by the ruling elite. Put differently, political affiliation in the civil service seems a deep rooted practice. Nevertheless, deep politicization of civil service structures blurs the distinctions between politics and administration and between politicians and public officials. In Ethiopia, therefore, politics is over expanded, jeopardizing the development of autonomous public administration.

Party domination on the public service appears in different forms and mechanisms. The first mechanism to dominate the public service is through indoctrination of ideology. Civil servants are highly influenced by party ideology and shaped to think and evaluate their actions in terms of their party discipline and principles. Second since appointment and promotions are political, civil servants are co-opted to join the ruling party. As a result the public service has become an extension of the party organ in government.

While, the general framework and some laws are there that intend creating neutral and apolitical civil service, these laws are critically violated. As a result, though political neutrality is supposed to be part of the public service ethos, the reality is that Ethiopian public service is not as apolitical as it is supposed to be.

There is huge political influence in appointments of civil service officials. In Ethiopia, therefore, politics is over expanded, jeopardizing the development of autonomous public administration.

Political interference into the civil service is exhibited in two forms. The first way is legal where the ruling party interferes in appointment of ministers and state ministers through one party dominated parliament where no different voice is heard. The second is more of implicit and subtle. In this case, senior party officials and ministers who are also among senior party leadership select middle level administrators based on loyalty.

The party assumes that by dominating the civil service, it is possible to implement the policies of government effectively. However, many evidences reveal that policies are poorly implemented and the civil service too weak to effectively implement the policies.

Therefore, while political neutrality is supposed to be part of the public service ethos, the reality is that the ruling party has made it an extension of its structure. The politicisation of the civil service is continued to the extent it becomes difficult to separate the ruling party (as the government of the day) and the public service. Hence, Ethiopian public service is not as apolitical as it is supposed to be.

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[1] Aberbach, Joel ; Robert D. Putnam; and Bert Rockman (1981) Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies


